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Abstract. Software testing is a key phase of many development method-
ologies as it provides a natural opportunity for integrating security early
in the software development lifecycle. However despite the known im-
portance of software testing, this phase is often overlooked as it is quite
difficult and labour-intensive to obtain test datasets to effectively test
an application. This lack of adequate automatic software testing renders
software applications vulnerable to malicious attacks after they are de-
ployed as detected software vulnerabilities start having an impact during
the production phase. Among such attacks are SQL injection attacks. Ex-
ploitation of SQL injection vulnerabilities by malicious programs could
result in severe consequences such as breaches of confidentiality and false
authentication. We present in this paper a search-based software testing
technique to detect SQL injection vulnerabilities in software applications.
This approach uses genetic programming as a means of generating our
test datasets, which are then used to test applications for SQL injection-
based vulnerabilities.
Keywords: Genetic Programming, Search-Based Testing, SQL Injec-
tions
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, many organisations have rapidly adopted Web appli-
cations to solve increasingly complex business problems making them widely
available on the Internet. However, with this high usability comes the risk of
rendering such business applications a natural target to malicious minds. Ap-
plications available through Web browsers have become exponentially more vul-
nerable in recent years [1] due to a wide range of attacks such as buffer overflow
attacks, cross-site scripting, SQL Injection attacks and many others.
Among the top ten Web application vulnerabilities published by the Open
Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [2] are SQL Injection Attacks (SQLIAs).
In 2011, the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s National Vulnera-
bility Database [3] reported 289 SQL injection Vulnerabilities (SQLIVs) in web-
sites, including those of IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco, WordPress, and Joomla.
In December 2012, security experts in SANS Institute reported a major SQL
injection attack that affected approximately 160,000 websites using Microsoft’s
Internet Information Services (MS-IIS), ASP.NET, and SQL Server frameworks.
An SQL injection is an attack in which malicious code is inserted into strings
that are later passed to an instance of the SQL Server for parsing and execution.
These types of attacks are particularly harmful as they could give attackers di-
rect access to the database thus enabling them to leak out very sensitive and
confidential information with severe consequences for any organisation. More
worrying is that SQLIAs have now been documented for well over a decade [4]
but still remain an active method of attacks as a result of the lack of effec-
tive techniques for detecting and preventing such attacks. Numerous techniques,
such as defensive programming and sophisticated input validation, have been
proposed and implemented to prevent some types of SQLIAs. However, such
techniques have proven incapable of withstanding new forms of SQLIAs as at-
tackers continue to find new exploits that can avoid the checks programmers
put in place. Moreover, defensive programming has proven to be very labour-
intensive as it requires constant interaction with testers therefore making it an
expensive exercise in terms of resources required.
Software testing is a key phase of many development methodologies as it
provides a natural opportunity for integrating security early in the software
development lifecycle. Inadequate testing of software applications during their
development renders these applications vulnerable attacks such as SQLIAs when
they are deployed into a live production environment. However despite the known
importance of software testing, this stage is often considered lightly as it could
be a laborious task. Most software development teams adopt a manual approach
in generating test cases thus limiting the number of test cases which could be
built and executed within the project’s budget.
Automated software testing techniques, such as Search-Based Software Test-
ing (SBST), are essential for the development of complex systems as they aim to
lower the cost of writing tests by enabling users to generate tests automatically.
We therefore present a new approach using SBST techniques for the detection
of SQLIVs in SQL-based database systems. This new approach will help solve
two of the biggest issues with existing SQLIA detection techniques; being fully
automated in terms of test case generation, it requires very little interaction with
testers, and it provides adequate levels of robustness and flexibility to deal with
new emerging patterns of SQLIA attacks.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview
of literature covering work related to the problem of test generation for SQLIVs.
In Section 3, we introduce the various types of SQLIAs and the technique they
each use. In Section 4, we introduce the design of the GP grammar corresponding
to SQLIAs. In Section 5, we define our anti-SQLIA system design and discuss
its implementation. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the results obtained from
the implementation of the system and in Section 7 we conclude the paper.
2 Related Work
A wide range of approaches have been proposed by researchers to address SQL
injection-based threats to Web applications. Appelt et al. [5] proposed a black-
box automated testing approach targeting SQLIVs, called U4SQLi. The ap-
proach rests on a set of mutation operators that manipulate legitimate inputs to
create new test inputs to trigger new SQLIAs. With this approach, it is possible
to use a combination of different mutation operators to generate a wide range
of attacks and generate inputs that contain new attack patterns, thus increasing
the likelihood of detecting vulnerabilities. The approach follows a similar pat-
tern with our proposed approach in that it uses SBST to detect SQLIVs. The
difference is with the algorithm used, U4SQLi uses genetic algorithms whereas
in our case, we use grammar-based genetic programming.
Su et al. [6] propose a grammar-based approach to detect and stop queries
containing SQLIAs by implementing their SQLCheck tool. The proposed ap-
proach tracks users’ input using a special symbol to mark the beginning and
end of each input string. This annotated query is called an augmented query.
The main idea is to forbid the augmented query from modifying the syntactic
structure of the rest of the query. This is achieved by constructing an augmented
grammar for this augmented query based on the grammar for a standard SQL
statement. At runtime, the augmented query is validated based on this grammar,
and is therefore rejected if it does not conform to the grammar.
Shahriar and Zulkernine [7], presented a mutation-based testing approach for
SQLIV testing. The authors proposed the use of nine injection operators that
inject SQLIVs in application source code. The nine mutation operators were
divided into two categories. The first category consists of four operators, which
inject faults into WHERE conditions of SQL queries, and the second category
consists of five operators, which inject faults into database API method calls.
These operators generate mutants, which can be killed with test data containing
SQLIAs. This approach is similar to the technique presented by Appelt et al. [5],
in that they both use mutants to test the presence of SQLIVs in SQL databases.
However, it differs from the approach of [5] in that the mutation is applied to the
source code of the application rather than the test input. Hence, it would not
adequately solve the problem, which we are trying to address in making testing a
less expensive process by automatically generating test cases, as it would require
high levels of user involvement to conduct testing using this approach.
Chan et al. [8] presented fault-based testing of SQL database applications.
This technique used seven mutation operators to represent faults of entity rela-
tionships model of a database driven application. These operators were used to
modify the cardinality of queries (e.g., replace “SELECT count (column1)” with
“SELECT count (column2)”), replace attributes with similar types (e.g., change
one column name with another of a similar data type) and replace participation
constraints (e.g., replace EXIST with NOT EXIST) and so on. Like the MUSIC
tool proposed by Shahriar and Zulkernine [7], this approach mutates the code
and not the test cases, and therefore it would not fulfil our desired goal of having
an automated way of generating test data to detect SQLIVs.
Shin et al. [9] proposed an approach for SQL injection vulnerability detec-
tion, automated by a prototype tool called SQLUnitGen. The tool combines
static analysis, runtime detection and automatic testing to identify input ma-
nipulation vulnerabilities. Kosuga et al. [10] presented a technique named Sa-
nia, for detecting SQLIVs during the development and debugging phases. Sania
investigates HTTP requests and SQL queries to try to discover SQLIAs by con-
structing parse trees of intended SQL queries written by developers. Terminal
leafs of parse trees would represent vulnerable spots, which are filled by possible
attack strings. The difference between the initial parse tree and the modified
parse tree generated from user-supplied attack strings results in warnings of
SQLIAs. Both of [9] and [10] differ to our case as neither injects SQLIAs. There
is also a high level of user involvement in both of these approaches and therefore
making them inadequate for our objective, which is to automate the generation
of test cases.
Ciampa et al. [11] proposed an approach to perform penetration testing of
Web applications. This approach differs to ours and many other existing tools
in that it does not randomly generate test data but relies on a knowledge base
of heuristics to guide the generation of test data. This is achieved by firstly
analysing the Web application with the aim of determining its hyperlinks struc-
ture and of identifying its input forms. Then it starts seeding a series of stan-
dard SQLIAs with the objective of letting the Web application report an error
message. Such standard attacks consist of a set of query strings that are not
dependent on the Web application. It then matches the output produced by the
Web application against an (extensible) library of regular expressions related to
error messages that databases can produce. It continues the attack using text
mined from the error messages with the objective of identifying likely table of
field names, until it is able to retrieve (part of) the database structure. A lim-
itation of this approach is that it depends on known SQL injection patterns to
detect errors during testing. This practice have sometimes proven insufficient
to test an application as it is incapable of handling unlearned or new attacks.
Also there might be a large number of different representations for the same
pattern, for example, using different encodings, which may not be captured in
the knowledge base.
Tuya et al. [12] proposed a set of mutation operators for SELECT queries
and then tested the mutants using a set of queries drawn from the NIST SQL
conformance test suite [13]. They then perform further experiments, aimed at
reducing the cost of testing using two different approaches: reducing the num-
ber of mutants (selective mutation) and reducing the number of test cases (by
selecting the order in which mutants are killed). The number of test cases are
reduced by ordering mutants from the most difficult to the easiest to be killed.
SQL DOM was proposed by McClure and Kruger [14] as a way of automat-
ing the defensive coding testing technique since the manual approach has often
proven to be labour-intensive and error-prone. SQL DOM contains a set of classes
that enable automated data type validation and escaping. When using this tool,
developers provide their own database schema and construct SQL statements us-
ing the SQL DOM API. The tool has proven to be quite useful when developers
need to use dynamic queries instead of parameterised queries for greater flexi-
bility. However, this solution could only be used with a new software application
under development, as it would require considerable amount of refactoring to get
it to work with legacy systems. However, our approach could easily be adapted
to any project as it entails black-box testing, which does not require knowledge
of the application code.
Thomas et al. [15] proposed an automated vulnerability removal approach,
which finds potentially vulnerable (dynamic) SQL statements in programs and
replaces them with parameterised SQL statements. Similar to the work of [14],
this approach is based on white-box testing requiring some knowledge of the
internal structure of the application.
Boyd et al. [16] proposed a tool called SQLrand, which prevents injection at-
tacks that contain keywords. Developers construct queries, which use randomised
keywords rather than the normal SQL keywords. This is different from our work
in that it only protects against attacks that contain SQL keywords, so although
an attacker may not be able to inject code containing keywords without the
secret key to randomisation, this approach would not prevent an attacker from
injecting other codes, which do not contain SQL keywords.
Finally, Halfond et al. [17] implemented the AMNESIA (Analysis for Moni-
toring and Neutralising SQL Injection Attack) tool to detect and prevent SQLIAs.
The tool first scans the application code to identify hotspot points in the appli-
cation code that issue SQL queries to the underlying database. For each hotspot,
a model is built which represents all the possible SQL queries that may be gen-
erated at that hotspot. Calls are then added to the runtime monitor for each
hotspot in the application. If a generated query is not consumed by the query
model, then it is considered an attack.
3 SQL Injection Attacks (SQLIAs)
SQLIAs occur when an attacker exploits an SQLIV by changing the intended
logic underlying an SQL query through inserting new SQL characters or key-
words into the query. Here, we describe some common SQLIA examples, although
our approach is general enough to cover any other SQLIAs.
3.1 Tautologies
Tautology attacks are attacks where the attacker injects code into conditional
statements so that these would always evaluate to a logical True value. The
consequences of such attacks generally depend on how the result of a query
is used by an application. These types of attacks are generally used to bypass
authentication and to return all data in a particular table. For example, an
attacker could submit,
anything’ OR ’x=x
instead of a password in an input HTML form. The resulting SQL query becomes:
SELECT id FROM users WHERE username=’Joe’ AND password=’anything’ OR ’x=x’
This transforms the entire WHERE clause into a tautology, which could return
every record in the users database.
3.2 Union Query
Union queries provide more flexibility in allowing legitimate queries to retrieve
additional information from the database. In such attacks, the attacker injects
a statement of the form UNION 〈injected query〉 to the original query. For
example:
’ Union Select cardNo FROM creditCards WHERE acctNo = 7909
when injected into the username field, modifies the original query to become:
SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = ’’ Union Select cardNo FROM
creditCards WHERE acctNo = 7909 -- AND password =
When this modified SQL query is executed by the application, the original
query would return null and the injected query returns the creditCard number
for the given account.
3.3 Piggyback Queries
Piggyback queries are similar to Union queries in that they append additional
queries to the original query. However unlike Union queries, the intention is not
to modify the original query but to just introduce new queries, which piggyback
on the original query. For example, in the case of our authentication query, an
attacker may submit the following query:
SELECT id FROM users WHERE username=’Joe’ AND password=’’;
drop table users;
which as expected, may result in the users table being dropped.
3.4 Malformed Queries
Malformed query attacks are used by an attacker to gather information about
the database. These attack types are often deployed in conjunction with other
SQLIAs such as Union and Piggyback queries, which require the attacker to
have some a priori knowledge of the database’s schema. Malformed queries take
advantage of error messages returned by an SQL server, for example the attacker
could inject,
convert(int,(SELECT top 1 name FROM sysobjects WHERE xtype=’u’))
into a pin input field for an authentication query. This would result in a new
malformed SQL query:
SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = ’Joe’ AND password = ’xxx’ AND
pin = convert(int, (SELECT top 1 name FROM sysobjects WHERE xtype=’u’))
If we assume that the database is indeed an SQL Server, the error mes-
sage returned may be of the sort “Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server
(0x80040E07) Conversion failed when converting the nvarchar value ’Credit-
Cards’ to data type int”. This error message provides useful information to aid
other attacks, since it informs the attacker that in fact an SQL server is run-
ning at the backend. Additionally, the second part of the error message reveals
that the first user-defined table in the database is actually ’CreditCards’. The
attacker could also use a similar approach to find all the columns in the table.
3.5 Inference Queries
The final type of SQLIAs we discuss here is called Inference queries, and these
are similar to malformed queries in that they allow the attacker to discover in-
formation about the SQL database. With this type of attacks, code is injected
to allow the application to behave differently based on the results of a particu-
lar query. For example, if the attacker inputs the following two queries at two
different times,
’legalUser’ AND 1=0 - -’
’legalUser’ AND 1=1 - -’
then an original SQL query would be modified into two different versions,
SELECT id FROM users WHERE username= ’legalUser’ AND
1=0 -- ’ AND password=" AND pin=0
SELECT id FROM users WHERE username= ’legalUser’ AND
1=1 -- ’ AND password=" AND pin=0
Let us suppose the application is an insecure application. When the first
query is run, and since 1 = 0 is always False, the application will return a
login error. However, at this stage, it is impossible for the attacker to determine
whether the error message was actually the result of the application validating
the input correctly and blocking the attack attempt. If the attacker submits the
second query, which always evaluates to True, and there is no login error, the
attacker can confirm that the username parameter is indeed vulnerable.
4 Design of the GP Grammar
In this section, we propose our automated technique for detecting SQLIVs. The
technique applies the concept of Genetic Programming (GP) to evolve legiti-
mate inputs to create new inputs, which could trigger SQLIAs in an application
under test. The proposed technique is driven by an evolutionary computation
system called ECJ [18], a framework that supports a variety of evolutionary com-
putation techniques such as genetic programming and genetic algorithms. The
ECJ framework was chosen as it is based on a well-engineered structure, which
makes heavy use of Java inheritance, abstraction and pattern-oriented design,
has great flexibility, with nearly all classes (and all of their settings) dynamically
determined at runtime by a user-provided parameter file. This means it is possi-
ble to support common functions of GP such as population initialisation, fitness,
selection and variation operators without requiring additional user-written code.
We now discuss the preparatory steps for defining our ECJ-based GP.
4.1 Terminal Sets
Terminal (and function) sets, specify the language used to evolve programs used
in GP. A terminal set represents the leaves of the parse tree, which corresponds to
the program inputs and it typically consists of variables, constants and functions
with no arguments. Our implementation included only one terminal node called
X, which holds an alphanumeric string. X is the program external input, a string
which will be evolved to generate SQL injection test cases. This node could be
used as a child for each of the seven internal nodes defined in the function set.
4.2 Functions Sets
Function sets are the interior nodes of the parse tree of the GP. They are usually
all the functions allowed in the program and are driven based on the nature of
the problem domain. Our function set contains a total of seven functions. These
functions are classified into two broad categories based on the purpose of the
functions; i.e. whether they are behaviour-changing or syntax-repairing. The def-
inition of these functions was inspired by previous mutation testing frameworks
by Appelt et al. [5], matching six of the mutation operators defined in [5].
Behaviour-Changing Functions An SQLIA occurs when an attacker changes
the intended effect of an SQL query by inserting new SQL keywords or opera-
tors into the query. This class of functions from our function set are intended
to evolve our legitimate inputs with SQLIAs to take advantage of vulnerabili-
ties in an application. Although there are a wide variety of behaviour-changing
attacks, we have restricted this function set to three examples, which represent
the most forms of simple SQLIAs. These examples include the AND, OR and
SEMI funcitons. The OR function accepts one input and appends “OR x=x” to
the end of the input where x could be a random number or any string enclosed
in quotes. For the AND function, it accepts one input and appends “AND x=y”
to the end of the input, where x and y could be different random numbers or
strings enclosed in quotes. When this resulting output is added to the WHERE
clause of an SQL query, it changes the behaviour of the query so that it always
evaluate to False therefore no records are returned. Finally, SEMI accepts one
input and appends a semicolon “;” followed by an additional SQL statement.
When this resulting string is added to the WHERE clause of the SQL query, it
changes the behaviour of the query by including a new and distinct query that
piggybacks itself to the original one. We show the relationship between SQLIAs
and these functions in Table 1.
Table 1. SQL Injection Attacks and Proposed Functions
Attack Function
Tautologies OR
Union Queries SEMI
Piggybacked Queries SEMI
Inference Attacks AND
Malformed Queries OR, SEMI, AND
Syntax-Repairing Functions An SQLIA attempt will only be successful if
the resulting query is syntactically correct. Often, malicious inputs may cause
SQL syntax errors to appear when these are combined with the original SQL
statements, which hinder attempts to undermine the system. Therefore, this next
class of functions, PARA, CMT, QUOTE and DoubleQUOTE, evolve inputs
with the goal of repairing SQL syntax errors when these are encountered. Such
functions are not used on their own, but in combination with the behaviour-
changing functions. First, we define PARA as a function that accepts a valid
input and appends a closing parenthesis to the end of the input. This is often
needed as sometimes the input provided is inserted within parenthesis used as
a parameter in an SQL function call or within a nested SELECT statement.
In such cases, a vulnerability can only be exploited if the opening parenthesis is
matched with a closing one. Next, the CMT function adds an SQL comment (i.e.
double dashes −− or a hash character #), ensuring that anything which follows
the comment is not executed. The QUOTE function accepts one input and adds
a single quote (’) to the end of the input. This is usually necessary for string
inputs, which are enclosed in quotes in the predefined SQL statement. Finally,
DoubleQUOTE accepts a single input and adds a double quote (”) to the end of
the input. This is usually necessary for string inputs, which are usually enclosed
in quotes in the SQL statement.
4.3 Fitness Function
Whilst the first two preparatory steps define the primitive set for the GP, and
therefore indirectly define the search space that the GP will explore, these two
steps are unable to instruct the GP system about which elements or regions of
the search space are good. This is the task of the fitness measure, the most dif-
ficult and most important concept of genetic programming. The fitness function
determines how well a program is able to solve the problem. It varies greatly
from one type of program to the next. In our GP implementation, the fitness of
an individual is assessed by determining the number of possible injection types
that this individual could generate when inserted into the WHERE clause of an
SQL query and calculating the sum of all those injection types.
Fitness =
∑
(1/(1 + S)) (1)
Where S is the number of different injection types found in one individual.
The more injections generated the smaller the fitness value and the fitter the
individual is. If an individual reaches a fitness of 1, it means the generated
string is likely to possess a syntactical error and would therefore not result in an
SQLIA, whereas a fitness of 0 represents a definite SQLIA.
4.4 Parameters
The fourth preparatory step specifies the control parameters for the run. The
most important control parameter is the population size. Most of the param-
eters defined in the koza.params seem adequate for our implementation. The
important parameters inherited by koza.params are as follows.
Initialisation. Our implementation used Koza’s halfBuilder technique to cre-
ate the initial population. HalfBuilder is essentially a mixture of grow and full
technique, with a ramp from 2 to 6 inclusive. The ramp is essentially an initial
random number between 2 and 6 inclusive, which is the maximum tree size.
Selection. In our implementation, tournament selection was used for selecting
individuals with a tournament size of 7. Tournament selection is a technique
whereby a number of individuals are chosen at random from the population,
then they are compared with one other to determine which will be the parent.
Operators. Our implementation used a mixture of mutation, reproduction and
crossover to evolve our inputs.
4.5 Termination and Solution Designation
The fifth preparatory step consists of specifying the termination criterion and the
method of designating the result of the run. In our implementation, the criterion
was the maximum number of generations to be run. The single individual was
harvested and designated as the result of the run, which was returned as the
solution to our problem domain.
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5 System Design and Implementation
Our testing system consists of three main components: An AntiSQLInjection
tool, an ECJ-based test generator and a vulnerable Web service. Figure 1 shows
the key components of our testing system. Our AntiSQLInjection tool uses heav-
ily an open source tool called General SQL Parser [19] that functions as a
database proxy, which serves to intercept communications between the target
system and its database in order to identify if an input is potentially harmful or
not. On the other hand, the Web service in this case was the subject application,
i.e. SuiteCRM [20]. We next outline how various components were implemented
to map our problem to the ECJ framework.
5.1 Representation of Individuals
When setting-up a GP problem in ECJ, we begin by defining the individuals
and the species that they belong to. Species available in ECJ vary from integer
vectors, to object lists and trees. An evolutionary run in ECJ would allow one
population an unlimited number of sub-populations containing an array of the
defined individuals, the species and fitness functions. Here, individuals are de-
fined as SQL injected input strings. The implementation used Abstract Syntax
Trees (ASTs) to represent our individuals, as this is able to hold an arbitrary
number of inputs. Our AST was defined using the built-in ECJ facility for defin-
ing and generating ASTs.
The tree structure in ECJ is typically defined by its types, tree constraints,
node constraints and a function set, which were all specified in the parameters
file. The tree constraints contain data elements shared by the tree. This includes
the definition of the tree, its return types and function set. The type essentially
defines all the possible node types, which could be found in a tree. ECJ’s type
objects are of two kinds: atomic types and set types. An atomic type is just a
single object (in fact, it is theoretically just a symbol) [18]. A set type is a set of
atomic types. Node constraints define what nodes can be children of other nodes
and how many children each node could have. The function set is used to link
the node constraints and their implementation in the Java class files.
We identified four atomic types and one set type:
– strValue: this type holds a string value, used as a terminal node
– intValue: this type holds an integer value, used as a terminal node
– syntax : this type is the output of a string where a syntax-repairing function
is applied, hence, it is the return value of a syntax-repairing function
– behaviour : this type is a string where a behaviour-changing function is ap-
plied, hence, it is the return value of a behaviour-changing function
– before-or-after : this is a set type with two members, strValue and syntax.
This would serve as a child to any behaviour changing function
The node constraints for our tree structure when applied to a GPNode would
describe three properties of the node: Number of children, the type of children
and the type of the parent of the children. Our tree consists of tree nodes rep-
resenting the function sets ()behaviour-changing and syntax-repairing), which
were implemented as java class files in the ec.app.sqli package. Their entries in
our parameter files are as follows, along with their respective constraints:
# We have one function set, of class GPFunctionSet
gp.fs.size = 1
gp.fs.0 = ec.gp.GPFunctionSet
# We call the function set "f0"
gp.fs.0.name = f0
# We have seven functions in the function set. They are:
gp.fs.0.size = 7
gp.fs.0.func.0 = ec.app.sqli.X
gp.fs.0.func.0.nc = nc0
gp.fs.0.func.1 = ec.app.sqli.Or
gp.fs.0.func.1.nc = nc1
gp.fs.0.func.2 = ec.app.sqli.And
gp.fs.0.func.2.nc = nc1
gp.fs.0.func.3 = ec.app.sqli.Cmt
gp.fs.0.func.3.nc = nc3
gp.fs.0.func.4 = ec.app.sqli.Quote
gp.fs.0.func.4.nc = nc2
gp.fs.0.func.5 = ec.app.sqli.Para
gp.fs.0.func.5.nc = nc2
gp.fs.0.func.6 = ec.app.sqli.Semi
gp.fs.0.func.6.nc = nc1
5.2 Evaluation and Fitness
After the representation of an individual is defined, the ECJ framework requires
the user to define a problem, which evaluates individuals and assigns fitness
values to them. As was mentioned earlier, the behaviour of each node type is
defined in a separate Java class with a single crucial method overridden:
public void eval(final EvolutionState state,
final int thread, final GPData input, final ADFStack stack,
final GPIndividual individual, final Problem problem)
{DoubleData rd = ((DoubleData)(input));
children[0].eval(state,thread,input,stack,individual,problem);
rd.x = rd.x + " or 1=1";}
The method is called when the GPNode is being executed in the course of ex-
ecuting the tree. The execution proceeds depth-first like the evaluation of a
standard parse tree. The eval() method has several arguments fairly straight-
forward to understand. The GPData argument is a simple data object passed
around amongst the GPNodes when they execute one another. This is how data
is passed from one node to another. The GPData object is defined in the param-
eter file as eval.problem.data = ec.app.sqli.StringData. During evaluation, our
GPData object passes through the tree. The object contains a simple string “x”.
Therefore, when this object arrives at the “OR” node, it becomes the case of
simply retrieving x and concatenating it with “OR 1=1”, which is then returned,
so that the value could then be used by some other syntax-repairing function.
The result of the syntax-repairing function is the return value of the tree, which
is stored in a text file and serves as the generated test case for our GP run. This
process will be done based on the maximum number of runs we have specified
in our parameters file.
Like most other grammar-based evolutionary GP systems implemented us-
ing the ECJ framework, our implementation uses KozaFitness. This is a fitness
function that stores an individual’s fitness. In KozaFitness, standardised fitness
and raw fitness are considered the same (there are different methods for these,
but they return the same thing). Standardised fitness f ranges from 0.0 inclusive
(the best) to infinity exclusive (the worst). Adjusted fitness converts standard-
ised fitness, using the formula adjf = 1/(1 + f), into a scale from 0.0 exclusive
(worst) to 1.0 inclusive (best). Our standardised fitness, which is passed to the
ECJ system was derived from the definition of 1 earlier in Section 4.3.
6 Results and Analysis
There is no standard benchmark application for testing the existence of SQLIVs.
However we evaluated the effectiveness of our approach on one open source sys-
tem called SuiteCRM [20]. SuiteCRM provides a software suite for the man-
agement of popular customer relationships. The application was implemented
using PHP, with a MySQL backend database, and provides a SOAP-based Web
Service API. The use of this application was motivated by related work [5], in
which a version of SugarCRM [21] was used to evaluate the mutation testing
approach proposed in [5]. Our evaluation approach is based on the following:
1. First, we identify the distinct list of injectable parameters for the collection of
Web services from our subject application. We define an injectable parameter
as an input parameter to a Web application whose value is used to build part
of a query that is sent to the database. We identified a total of 4 injectable
parameters that are being used across the 26 Web services.
2. We identify legitimate inputs for each of the injectable parameters so that
these are passed to our GP tool to generate SQLIAs, which will used to test
for SQLIVs.
3. We create a repository of SQL statements for each injectable parameter to
mimic a similar structure to what exists in the subject application.
4. We generate test cases from our GP tool from the legitimate inputs identified
for each parameter in 2.
5. And finally, we use test cases obtained from our GP tool and run these
through our AntiSQLInjection tool for each injectable parameter to conduct
our tests.
Though most of the run parameters were already predefined by inheriting the
Koza parameter file, it is worth mentioning here the values used for each param-
eter during a GP run, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. GP Experiment Parameters
Parameter Value
Population size 1024
Generation size 50
Crossover rate 90%
Mutation rate 10%
Selection method Tournament selection
Tournament size 7
Number of runs 20
During the experiment evaluation, we investigated the first research ques-
tion, the effectiveness of our technique in detecting and preventing SQLIAs. The
evaluation did not include all parameters of the subject application as it would
have taken a substantial amount of time to execute every parameter. The focus
therefore was only on the vulnerable parameters which were already identified
in a related work [5]. Starting with two legitimate inputs for each parameter,
our GP system generated 2048 malicious inputs for each such parameter. These
malicious inputs were then applied using the AntiSQLInjection tool. For each
parameter, we tracked the number of inputs, which were able to exploit the
vulnerability in our subject application. The test results are shown in Table 3.
The table shows for each parameter of our chosen subject the number of un-
successful attacks (Unsuccessful), the number of successful attacks (Successful),
and the number of our generated inputs, which resulted in a syntax error and
would therefore not be successful in launching an attack. As the table shows,
our tool was able, for all vulnerable parameters of our subject application, to
successfully create test cases, which would enable us to exploit vulnerabilities of
the application.
Table 3. Results of our SQLIA Tests
Operation Parameter Successful Unsuccessful Syntax
(Flagged) (Unflagged) Error
get entry list query 136 261 1651
get entry list order by 202 690 1257
search by module assigned user id 56 1233 778
get relationships related module query 478 115 1455
get entries count query 145 343 1560
set relationships value 1203 0 845
Whilst our tool was able to launch successful attacks for all parameters, we
did note an exceptionally high number of inputs resulting in syntax errors. This
could perhaps be corrected in the future by having stricter type constraints
on our GP implementation. We also noted a significant number of syntactically
correct, yet un-flagged inputs. With further investigation we discovered that this
was an issue related to the AntiSQLInjection tool and not our GP system as when
these same inputs were applied directly to our subject application, they were able
to cause successful attacks. This implies a weakness in the implementation of the
AntiSQLInjection tool, where it is sometimes unable to identify attack patterns.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented a GP-based approach for automatically generating test cases for
the detection of SQLIAs. Our approach is general in the sense that it is capable
of generating any malicious SQL query possible to construct based on the syn-
tax of SQL commands. We demonstrated how our solution can be implemented
using open source toolkits and we discussed the results against a subject ap-
plication, namely SuiteCRM [20]. For future work, we would like fine-tune our
implementation to obtain better rates of syntactic errors in the generated test
cases, which would improve the performance of our tool. We would also like to
widen the set of functions used in generating SQLIAs, including functions related
to other forms of SQL-based attacks such as cross-site scripting.
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